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Brain and (bad) behaviour
At an ethics seminar in Oxford back in the mid-1960s, the eminent philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe declared, 'It's going to be difficult to do ethics until contemporary psychology completes its project'. Being an ardent disciple of Wittgenstein, she was convinced that the soul, the seat of moral agency, was not a 'ghost in the machine', but embodied, and indeed 'embrained'. She was aware, moreover, that knowledge of how the brain, and the body, relates to the mind was on the move. Had she been able to forecast the enormous strides in neuroscience and genetics in the decades ahead she would certainly have included those disciplines within the realms of what she termed psychology's project.
I had reason to recall Anscombe's remark during an encounter at the Salk Institute in the mid-1990s, the Decade of the Brain, when I asked the cognitive scientist (formerly physicist) Professor Terry Sejnowski what difference switching to neuroscience had made to his personal life. He said,'I'm less prone to judge others . . . neuroscience teaches us that all our drives and compulsions are individual and certainly unequal'. Hence, returning to Anscombe's remark, it is worth speculating whether progress in neuroscience has made 'doing ethics' harder or more easy, 40 years on. Despite Wittgenstein, Anscombe was soaked in a Catholic tradition of moral agency which argued an equivalence of freedom in all human beings (unless insane) to obey the dictates of conscience, and it was precisely this equivalent moral agency that 'psychology' was throwing into question.
The neuroscience project has brought no lack of confident assertions of necessary and sufficient causal links between moral behaviour and the brain. Not so long ago at a symposium sponsored by the Science and Medical Network, a biochemist read a paper arguing a link between diet, brain chemistry and criminal behaviour. He had conducted a study of young delinquents who showed dramatic improvements after being treated for lead overload and zinc depletion. There were other studies he could cite which showed that prisoners who had been offered a zinc supplement in their diet while in jail were less prone to recidivism than a group denied the supplement. At one point a symposium participant suggested that if there was merit in the proposed link, surely we should consider forcing troublesome populations (Bosnia? Iraq?) to take zinc supplements, or perhaps introduce it into the drinking water like fluoride. That the group, which included Professor Susan Greenfield, Sandy McCall-Smith, the Professors Steven and Hilary Rose, and Mary Midgely, did not jump at the recommendation was a token of their discomfort with simplistic reductionist diagnoses, and solutions, for complex behavioural and social processes.
Authentically simple links between the 'wet-stuff' and moral behaviour have long been familiar, however. Take Phineas Gage, a decent chap by all accounts, who suffered a prefrontal lobe injury while working on a railroad track. He survived but became a foul-mouthed, philandering lout. That neuroscience could lend itself accordingly to scientistic medicalization of moral behaviour was all too evident in the notorious Twinky Defence (involving the San Francisco killer who copped a plea based on the score of eating too many iced cup cakes). Such pleas continue to be mooted in the courts although they are invariably met with resistance from juries, judges, specialists in psychology and sociology, and indeed sensible neuroscientists. And yet, the questions raised by the relationship between neuroscience and good and bad behaviour are multiplying and irresistible. Advances over the past 20 years have sealed forever the fate of behavioural psychology which treated the brain as a black box, restricting itself to input and output. But have the advances made doing ethics any easier? Non-invasive scanning, ever more precise knowledge of deficits and the action of neurotransmitters have advanced immeasurably beyond the days of crude localization. But the link between neuroscience and morality remains problematic. Not the least of our problems is establishing whether certain peculiarities in the wet-stuff are caused by behaviour, good or bad, or the other way about. And what price prediction? Four years ago the neuroscientist Professor Adrian Raine of UCLA localized (with the help of PET and MRI) psychopathic behaviour in anomalies of the orbitofrontal cortex. He showed that 21 men guilty of violent crimes had shrunken prefrontal cortices (reduced by 14% from the norm). Should we screen the population and lock up the owners of reduced prefrontal cortices? As forensic psychologist Dr Julian Boon (of Leicester University) commented when Raine's findings were first published, 'I imagine that some of my most gifted colleagues have psychopathic-type brains. What makes one personality a serial killer and another a university professor, is probably an unknown and an unknowable nurturing and environmental factor'.
All this makes the publication of Laurence Tancredi's book Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality an event of considerable interest. Tancredi, who is the professor of psychiatry at New York University School of Medicine, admits that the medicalization of immoral behaviour creates a volatile Pandora's box of confusions between the 'mad and the bad'.
'If we determine that both psychosis and criminality arise from brain biology, what happens to our distinction between the two? Must we abandon it?' Tancredi tells us that while he is loath to abandon the distinction entirely, since a degree of rationality surely remains with the 'sane', there is a problem. 'The bad may also claim biological changes . . . these changes may not directly affect an individual's capacity to be rational, but their impact may nonetheless be so compelling that the afflicted person cannot truly rely on his "rational" abilities to control his behavior.'
Tancredi's book contains a wealth of information on recent research programmes into the relationship between the 'mad and the bad', including such intriguing phenomena as Kluver-Bucy syndrome (herpes simplex encephalitis) as a cause of hyper-sexuality. But the thrust of his overall argument is that neuroscience is shifting the focus of the culture towards a morality based on 'physicalism' rather than 'mentalese'. By this he means that we should be seeking moral behaviour in 'biology', in the wet-stuff and in our genes, rather than in traditional notions, beliefs and ideas as to what it means to be human. The proposal is similar to the Churchlands' (P.M. and P.S.) description of 'neurophilosophy' and their recommendation that we abandon what they term 'folk psychology' in pursuit of more rigorous, that is, neuroscientific, descriptions of human behaviour. Giving primacy to physicalism, and chucking out 'folk psychology', or 'mentalese' indicates, of course, the downgrading of history, philosophy, psychology and, indeed, literature, as aids to understanding why we do the things that we do, individually and collectively. But does this mean that physicalism, or neurophilosophy, involves the downgrading of imagination as a means of understanding the good and the bad in us? Tancredi does not so much downgrade imagination as ignore it, as do the Churchlands, and they are not alone in this among philosophizing neuroscientists. The neglect is strange for it might have helped Tancredi to avoid what seems to me a significant muddle in relation to what he calls 'moral proscriptions in the Judeo-Christian tradition'. According to Tancredi the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sins were our 'articulation of responses etched in the biological structure of the brain'. Setting aside those inadequate folk psychological explanations, he can confidently assert that at last we 'are getting a handle on brain biology as it relates to specific moral precepts, and in time all of them will be seen as originating, to some degree, in biology'. Quite apart from the absence here of social relations, there is a major problem. Understanding the Judeo-Christian story is not simply a matter of invoking a set of proscriptions-commandmentsagreed among Jews and Christians, but of acknowledging the process by which subscribers to that tradition believe that they are constantly tempted, and yet free to obey the Ten Commandments and the dictates of their conscience. Nevertheless, as Elizabeth Anscombe and Terry Sejnowski acknowledged over a span of 40 years, psychology and neuroscience have put such traditional notions under a severe strain. If our drives and compulsions are individual, and unequal, and arising out of our genes and the wet-stuff, rather The central issue is whether a neuroscientifically informed view of what it means to be human denies free will, and therefore any possibility of moral behaviour in the traditional sense of the term? We can surely argue for the authenticity of a measure of freedom based on our ability to make models of future scenarios, along with suppositions as to their consequences, which implies, on the basis of common-sense, that we are capable of choices. If imagination-modelling alternative future actions and outcomes-is the key to our ability to make choices, then one is bound to ask why it is that neuroscientists tend to neglect the phenomenon. Imagination, making models in the mind, outside real time, as it were (for example, a General can spend a week modelling a battle that will take 2 h), transcends both physics and the wet-stuff, even though it is undeniable that imaginative processes are firmly based in our biology rather than a Cartesian spooky-stuff soul.
Ever since Plato there have been profound and inseparable links between aesthetics and ethics, precisely because of that perceived measure of choice in both art and moral behaviour. Nancy C. Andreason's The Creating Brain: the Neuroscience of Genius is an attempt to apply neuroscience to a deeper understanding of the source of artistic creativity. She places decisive stress on the theme of freedom in genius, but it is a sense of freedom that emerges from the least neuroscientific dimension of her book. She argues, for example, that the flowering of Renaissance genius was occasioned in the 16th century by the revival of Greek ideas and the consequent rejection of the 'years of medieval scholasticism'. As she would have it, before the Renaissance artists 'simply copied what their masters had done', and 'philosophers elaborated on the texts of the church Fathers'. I am not sure that historians of art would agree with her entirely; as for philosophers, she seems unaware that the leading philosopher of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, had himself been influenced by a revival of Greek ideas in the form of Aristotle. Be that as it may, she asserts that 'encouraging intellectual freedom is one of the best ways to create creative brains . . . Creative personality is adventurous, exploratory, tolerant of ambiguity, and intolerant of boundaries and limits.' Competition, she goes on, is a crucial ground condition: 'Not unlike the present-day competition to design and build the World Trade Center replacement, [Renaissance] authorities invited artists or architects to submit designs, and the one deemed to be superior was selected . . . Creative people are individualistic and confident . . . They may thrive best when pitted against one another.' So far so good, but in her casehistories of figures as diverse as Mozart, Coleridge and Neil Simon, she appears to stress not so much the importance of individual freedom in artistic endeavour as the capacity of the artist to summon imaginative experience from the depths of the unconscious. Hence her first case history is a lengthy analysis of Coleridge's Kubla Khan, one of the least 'conscious', and perhaps the most controversial, of that poet's works, issuing as it does, by his own admission, from a dose of laudanum. Disturbed from his drug-induced poetic reverie, the poem remained forever incomplete.
As for the specifically neuroscientific dimension of creativity, Andreasen gives us a run-of-the-mill account of plasticity: 'when we neuroscientists say that the brain is plastic we are not talking about polymers . . . We mean that the brain is marvellously responsive, adaptable, and eternally changing'. What she does not hazard at any point in her presentation is a neuroscientific account of how the brain consciously, freely and imaginatively evokes connections that are undetermined, so as to invoke metaphors, symbols and structures that are surprising, original, beautiful and pleasing. Undoubtedly great art has always involved a partly unconscious process, but ever since Aristotle's poetics it has been understood in Western aesthetics that conscious freedom, a measure of control, is crucial to the artistic process. To deny essential freedom in creativity seems to me as destructive to notions of authentic art as it is to the possibility of authentic moral behaviour.
Meanwhile the task of disentangling madness and badness is ongoing, and the most profitable research is likely to emerge from a detailed analysis of specific syndromes. William Hirstein's study of the relationship between lying and confabulation is an example of this. In his Brain Fiction, Hirstein, a philosopher of mind, attempts to separate neurological syndromes that give rise to false accounts from one that is purely moral-namely lying. Two examples of the neurological syndromes, cited at the beginning of this excellent book, suffice. A neurologist greets a patient in a hosptial and asks what he did with his weekend. The patient claims that that he spent the 2 days at a conference. But the patient never left the hospital. The doctor is not surprised, for his patient has Korsakoff's syndrome, involving a disorder that affects memory. Unlike other patients with memory problems, who readily acknowledge their gaps, the Korsakoff's patient will fill the gap with memories that did not happen or that happened in the distant past; the patient is suffering from confabulation.
The doctor moves on to a second patient, a stroke victim with consequent paralysis who is denying to close members of her family that there is anything wrong with her. She is suffering from hemiplegia or anosognosia-literally the absence of knowledge of an illness. The condition is associated with damage to a part of the right hemisphere.
What the two conditions have in common is that neither patient appears to be lying, in other words setting out deliberately to deceive. The patients are reporting what seems to them to be the case. Confabulation was first employed by Karl Bonhoeffer in the first decade of the 20th century as filling in the gaps of missing memory. The definition is echoed by the American Psychiatric Association's DSM IV: 'the recitation of an imaginary event to fill in gaps of memory'. Confabulation also occurs in other syndromes that involve no memory problems, including anosognosia for hemiplegia, split-brain syndrome, Anton's syndrome (denial of blindness), and Capgras' syndrome, the illusion that an impostor is standing in for an acquaintance, and schizophrenia.
It was to be expected that consciousness, as in subjective awareness of the difference between making true and false statements, would be a crucial focus of this study. Hirstein's thesis accordingly stakes a claim to a place in the broad front of attempts to study consciousness scientifically. Of significant interest is his view (originally proposed by the psychologist and neurologist Marcel Kinsbourne) that in 'neglect' representations of the body 'are not sufficiently developed to be integrated into the person's larger conscious states'. The reason, according Kinsbourne, is that 'the set of cortical areas currently bound into the current state is constantly changing . . . If something in consciousness were always signalling a gap from areas that have not been integrated, this would most likely seriously disrupt the functions associated with consciousness . . . hence, in the absence of a positive error, we assume that our conscious states are complete'.
Hirstein's book is an important contribution to the literature of confabulation, self-deception and lying, yet it was probably completed before the discovery in the United States of the fraudulent sections of James Frey's memoir A Million Little Pieces, which has sparked a furore in the literary and publishing world, prompting what some critics are calling 'the cult of phoney memoirs'. One suspects that there is a rich source of future multidisciplinary research, neuroscientific, philosophical and literary, to be plundered in the vast literature of autobiographies and memoirs that would fail the test of, say, the New Yorker's famously rigorous fact-checking department.
But perhaps the most crucial area of future clinical application of neuroscience to the good and the bad remains, as Tancredi suggests, the exploration of psychopathy, which in the United Kingdom continues to pose vexing questions in the reformulation of the government's Mental Health Act. As the law stands psychopaths are untreatable, hence they cannot be forcibly detained in mental institutions even if a judge suspects that they might well offend. So are we at least at the threshold of a new era, as Antonio Damasio suggests, when we will establish reliable links between brain structure and psychopathy? And will that lead to early drug discoveries to treat them?
As Tancredi demonstrates, there is no lack of research activity and enthusiasm, but it has taken an unusual theatrical director to offer a warning. At the outset of the Decade of the Brain, Peter Brook produced a play entitled The Man Who, based on Oliver Sacks's famous book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat. In the play, Brook illustrates the condition of visual agnosia by showing a patient looking at a video of the sea shore. The patient can see the pulsing lines of blue and white and yellow, but can't put them together to recognize the images for what they represent: the sea--he sees everything and yet sees nothing. At the end of the play, the patients and the neurologists come on stage to gaze at another video: it shows an image of a PET-MRI combination of the brain, luridly coloured and pulsing for effect. The actors sit gazing at the image as if with satisfaction at having, at last, reached a deeper understanding of where the molecules meet the human soul. But Brook evidently wants his audience to come to a rather different conclusion. He wants us to understand that our captivation with the ubiquitous, iconic representation of the mind in the form of a brain scan represents a striking example of cultural and spiritual agnosia.
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